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Abstract. Many prior face anti-spoofing works develop discriminative models
for recognizing the subtle differences between live and spoof faces. Those ap-
proaches often regard the image as an indivisible unit, and process it holistically,
without explicit modeling of the spoofing process. In this work, motivated by the
noise modeling and denoising algorithms, we identify a new problem of face de-
spoofing, for the purpose of anti-spoofing: inversely decomposing a spoof face
into a spoof noise and a live face, and then utilizing the spoof noise for classifi-
cation. A CNN architecture with proper constraints and supervisions is proposed
to overcome the problem of having no ground truth for the decomposition. We
evaluate the proposed method on multiple face anti-spoofing databases. The re-
sults show promising improvements due to our spoof noise modeling. Moreover,
the estimated spoof noise provides a visualization which helps to understand the
added spoof noise by each spoof medium.
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1 Introduction
With the increasing influence of smart devices in our daily lives, people are seeking
for secure and convenient ways to access their personal information. Biometrics, such
as face, fingerprint, and iris, are widely utilized for person authentication due to their
intrinsic distinctiveness and convenience to use. Face, as one of the most popular modal-
ities, has received increasing attention in the academia and industry in the recent years
(e.g., iPhone X). However, the attention also brings a growing incentive for hackers to
design biometric presentation attacks (PA), or spoofs, to be authenticated as the gen-
uine user. Due to the almost no-cost access to the human face, the spoof face can be
as simple as a printed photo paper (i.e., print attack) and a digital image/video (i.e., re-
play attack), or as complicated as a 3D Mask and facial cosmetic makeup. With proper
handling, those spoofs can be visually very close to the genuine user’s live face. As a
result, these call for the need of developing robust face anti-spoofing algorithms.
As the most common spoofs, print attack and replay attack have been well studied
previously, from different perspectives. The cue-based methods aim to detect liveness
cues [1,2] (e.g., eye blinking, head motion) to classify live videos. But these meth-
ods can be fooled by video replay attacks. The texture-based methods attempt to com-
pare texture difference between live and spoof faces, using pre-defined features such as
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Fig. 1. The illustration of face spoofing and anti-spoofing processes. De-spoofing process aims to
estimate a spoof noise from a spoof face and reconstruct the live face. The estimated spoof noise
should be discriminative for face anti-spoofing.
LBP [3,4], HOG [5,6]. Similar to texture-based methods, CNN-based methods [7,2,8]
design a unified process of feature extraction and classification. With a softmax loss
based binary supervision, they have the risk of overfitting on the training data. Regard-
less of the perspectives, almost all the prior works treat face anti-spoofing as a black
box binary classification problem. In contrast, we propose to open the black box by
modeling the process of how a spoof image is generated from its original live image.
Our approach is motivated by the classic image de-X problems, such as image de-
noising and de-blurring [9,10,11,12]. In image de-noising, the corrupted image is re-
garded as a degradation from the additive noise, e.g., salt-and-pepper noise and white
Gaussian noise. In image de-blurring, the uncorrupted image is degraded by motion,
which can be described as a process of convolution. Similarly, in face anti-spoofing,
the spoof image can be viewed as a re-rendering of the live image but with some “spe-
cial” noise from the spoof medium and the environment. Hence, the natural question is,
can we recover the underlying live image when given a spoof image, similar to image
de-noising?
Yes. This paper shows “how” to do this. We call the process of decomposing a spoof
face to the spoof noise pattern and a live face as Face De-spoofing, shown in Fig. 1.
Similar to the previous de-X works, the degraded image x ∈ Rm can be formulated as
a function of the original image xˆ, the degradation matrix A ∈ Rm×m and an additive
noise n ∈ Rm.
x = Axˆ+ n = xˆ+ (A− I)xˆ+ n = xˆ+N(xˆ), (1)
where N(xˆ) = (A− I)xˆ+n is the image-dependent noise function. Instead of solving
A and n, we decide to estimate N(xˆ) directly since it is more solvable under the deep
learning framework [13,14,15,16,17]. Essentially, by estimatingN(xˆ) and xˆ, we aim to
peel off the spoof noise and reconstruct the original live face. Likewise, if given a live
face, face de-spoofing model should return itself plus zero noise. Note that our face de-
spoofing is designed to handle paper attack, replay attack and possibly make-up attack,
but our experiments are limited to the first two PAs. The benefits of face de-spoofing
are twofold: 1) it reverses, or undoes, the spoofing generation process, which helps us
to model and visualize the spoof noise pattern of different spoof mediums. 2) the spoof
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noise itself is discriminative between live and spoof images and hence is useful for face
anti-spoofing.
While face de-spoofing shares the same challenges as other image de-X problems,
it has a few distinct difficulties to conquer:
No Ground Truth: Image de-X works often use synthetic data where the original
undegraded image could be used as ground truth for supervised learning. In contrast,
we have no access to xˆ, which is the corresponding live face of a spoof face image.
No Noise Model: There is no comprehensive study and understanding about the spoof
noise. Hence it is not clear how we can constrain the solution space to faithfully estimate
the spoof noise pattern.
Diverse Spoof Mediums: Each type of spoofs utilizes different spoof mediums for
generating spoof images. Each spoof medium represents a specific type of noise pattern.
To address these challenges, we propose several constraints and supervisions based
on our prior knowledge and the conclusions from a case study (in Section 3.1). Given
that a live face has no spoof noise, we impose the constraint thatN(xˆ) of a live image is
zero. Based on our study, we assume that the spoof noise of a spoof image is ubiquitous,
i.e., it exists everywhere in the spatial domain of the image; and is repetitive, i.e., it is the
spatial repetition of certain noise in the image. The repetitiveness can be encouraged by
maximizing the high-frequency magnitude of the estimated noise in the Fourier domain.
With such constraints and auxiliary supervisions proposed in [18], a novel CNN ar-
chitecture is presented in this paper. Given an image, one CNN is designed to synthesize
the spoof noise pattern and reconstruct the corresponding live image. In order to exam-
ine the reconstructed live image, we train another CNN with auxiliary supervision and
a GAN-like discriminator in an end-to-end fashion. These two networks are designed to
ensure the quality of the reconstructed image regarding its discriminativeness between
live and spoof, and the visual plausibility of the synthesized live image.
To summarize, the main contributions of this work include:
 We offer a new perspective for detecting the spoofing face from print attack and
replay attack by inversely decomposing a spoof face image into the live face and the
spoofing noise, without having the ground truth of either.
 A novel CNN architecture is proposed for face de-spoofing, where appropriate
constraints and auxiliary supervisions are imposed.
 We demonstrate the value of face de-spoofing by its contribution to face anti-
spoofing and the visualization of the spoof noise patterns.
2 Prior Work
We review the most relevant prior works to ours from two perspectives: texture-based
face anti-spoofing and de-X problems.
Texture-based Face Anti-spoofing Texture analysis is widely adopted in face anti-
spoofing as well as other computer vision tasks [19,20], where defining an effective
feature representation is the key endeavor. Early works apply the hand-crafted feature
descriptors, such as LBP [3,4,21], HoG [5,6], SIFT [22] and SURF [23], to project
the faces to a low-dimension embedding. However, those hand-crafted features are not
specifically designed to capture the subtle differences in the spoofing faces, and thus the
embedding may not be discriminative. In addition, those features may not be robust to
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variations such as illumination, pose, and etc. To overcome some of these difficulties,
researchers tackle the problem in different domains, such as HSV and YCbCr color
space [24,25], temporal domain [26,27,28,29] and Fourier spectrum [30].
Heading into the deep learning era, researchers aim to build deep models for a
higher accuracy. Most of the CNN works treat face anti-spoofing as a binary classifica-
tion problem and apply the softmax loss function. Compared to hand-crafted features,
such models [29] achieve remarkable improvements in the intra-testing (i.e., train and
test within the same dataset). However, during the cross-testing (i.e., train and test in
different datasets), these CNN models exhibit a poor generalization ability due to the
overfitting to training data. Atoum et al. [31] and Liu et al. [?] observe the overfitting
issue of the softmax loss, and both propose novel auxiliary-driven loss functions in-
stead of softmax to supervise the CNN. These works bring us the insight that we need
to involve the domain knowledge to solve face anti-spoofing.
To the best of our knowledge, all the previous methods are discriminative models.
There are only a few papers [22,2] trying to categorize the types and properties of the
spoof noise pattern, such as color distortion and moire´ pattern. In this work, we ana-
lyze the properties of spoof noise and design a GAN-fashion generative model [32] to
estimate the spoof noise pattern and peel it off the spoof image. We believe by decom-
posing the spoof image, CNN can analyze the spoof noise more directly and effectively,
and gain more knowledge in tackling face anti-spoofing.
De-X problems De-X problems, such as de-noising, de-blurring, de-mosaicing, super-
resolution and inpainting [33,13,14,15,34,35,16,17,36,37,38], are classic low-level vi-
sion problems that remove the degradation effect or artifacts from the image. General
de-noising works assume additive Gaussian noise and researchers propose non-local
filters [33] or CNNs [13,34] to exploit the inherent similarity within the images. For
de-mosaicing and super-resolution, many models, such as ResNet in [14,15] and joint
models in [16,17,35], are learnt from the given pairs of low-quality input and high-
quality ground truth. In image inpainting, users mark the area to inpaint in a mask map
and apply the filling based on the existing patch texture and the overall view structure
in the unmasked region [39,36,37].
One advantage of existing de-X problems is that most of the image degradation can
be easily synthesized. This brings two benefits: 1) it provides the model training with
the input degraded samples and golden ground-truth original images for supervision.
2) it is easy to synthesize a large amount of data for training and evaluation. On the
contrary, degradation due to spoofing is versatile, complex, and subtle. It consists of
2-stage degradation: one from the spoof medium (e.g., paper and digital screen), and
the other from the interaction of the spoof medium with the imaging environment. Each
stage includes a large number of variations, such as medium type, illumination, non-
rigid deformation and sensor types. Combination of these variations makes the overall
degradation varies greatly. As a result, it is almost impossible to mimic realistic spoof-
ing by synthesizing a degradation, which is a distinct challenge of face de-spoofing
compared to the conventional de-X problems.
Without the ground truth of the degraded image, face de-spoofing becomes a very
challenging problem. In this work, we propose an encoder-decoder architecture with
novel loss functions and supervisions to solve the de-spoofing problem.
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Fig. 2. The illustration of the spoof noise pattern. Left: live face and its local regions. Right: Two
registered spoofing faces from print attack and replay attack. For each sample, we show the local
region of the face, intensity difference to the live image, magnitude of 2D FFT, and the local
peaks in the frequency domain that indicates the spoof noise pattern. Best viewed electronically.
3 Face De-spoofing
In this section, we start with a case study of spoof noise pattern, which demonstrates a
few important characteristics of the noise. This study motivates us to design the novel
CNN architecture that will be presented in Sec. 3.2.
3.1 A Case Study of Spoof Noise Pattern
The core task of face de-spoofing is to estimate the spoofing-relevant noise pattern in
the given face image. Despite the strength of using a CNN model, we are still facing
the challenge of learning without the ground truth of the noise pattern. To address this
challenge, we would like to first carry out a case study on the noise pattern with the
objectives of answering the following questions: 1) is Eqn. 1 a good modeling of the
spoof noise? 2) what characteristics does the spoof noise hold?
Let us denote a genuine face as Iˆ. By using printed paper or video replay on digital
devices, the attacker can manufacture a spoof image I from Iˆ. Considering no non-
rigid deformation between I and Iˆ, we summarize the degradation from Iˆ to I as the
following steps:
1. Color distortion: Color distortion is due to a narrower color gamut of the spoof
medium (e.g. LCD screen or Toner Cartridge). It is a projection from the original
color space to a tinier color subspace. This noise is dependent on the color intensity
of the subject, and hence it may apply as a degradation matrix to the genuine face
I during the degradation.
2. Display artifacts: Spoof mediums often use several nearby dots/sensors to approx-
imate one pixel’s color, and they may also display the face differently than the
original size. Approximation and down-sampling procedure would cause a certain
degree of high-frequency information loss, blurring, and pixel perturbation. This
noise may also apply as a degradation matrix due to its subject dependence.
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Fig. 3. The proposed network architecture.
3. Presenting artifacts: When presenting the spoof medium to the camera, the medium
interacts with the environment and brings several artifacts, including reflection and
transparency of the surface. This noise may apply as an additive noise.
4. Imaging artifacts: Imaging lattice patterns such as screen pixels on the camera’s
sensor array (e.g. CMOS and CCD) would cause interference of light. This effect
leads to aliasing and creates moire´ pattern, which appears in replay attack and some
print attack with strong lattice artifacts. This noise may apply as an additive noise.
These four steps show that the spoof image I can be generated via applying degra-
dation matrices and additive noises to Iˆ, which is basically conveyed by Eqn. 1. As
expressed by Eqn. 1, the spoof image is the summation of the live image and image-
dependent noise. To further validate this model, we show an example in Fig. 2. Given a
high-quality live image, we carefully produce two spoof images via print and replay at-
tack, with minimal non-rigid deformation. After each spoof image is registered with the
live image, the live image becomes the ground truth live image if we would perform de-
spoofing on the spoof image. This allows us to compute the difference between the live
and spoof images, which is the noise pattern N (ˆI). To analyze its frequency properties,
we perform FFT on the spoof noise and show the 2D shifted magnitude response.
In both spoof cases, we observe a high response in the low-frequency domain, which
is related to color distortion and display artifacts. In print attack, repetitive noise in
Step 3 leads to a few “peak” responses in the high-frequency domain. Similarly, in
the replay attack, visible moire´ pattern reflects as several spurs in the low-frequency
domain, and the lattice pattern that causes the moire´ pattern is represented as peaks in
the high-frequency domain. Moreover, spoof patterns are uniformly distributed in the
image domain due to the uniform texture of the spoof mediums. And the high response
of the repetitive pattern in the frequency domain exactly demonstrates that it appears
widely in the image and thus can be viewed as ubiquitous.
Under this ideal registration, the comparison between live and spoof images pro-
vides us a basic understanding of the spoof noise pattern. It is a type of texture that has
the characteristics of repetitive and ubiquitous. Based on this modeling and noise char-
acteristics, we design a network to estimate the noise without the access to the precisely
registered ground truth live image, as this case study has.
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Table 1. The network structure of DS Net, DQ Net and VQ Net. Each convolutional layer is
followed by an exponential linear unit (ELU) and batch normalization layer. The input image
size for DS Net is 256 × 256 × 6. All the convolutional filters are 3 × 3. 0\1 Map Net is the
bottom-left part, i.e., conv1-10, conv1-11, and conv1-12.
DS Net (Encoder Part) DS Net (Decoder Part) DQ Net VQ Net
Layer Chan./Stri. Outp. Size Layer Chan./Stri. Outp. Size Layer Chan./Stri. Outp. Size Layer Chan./Stri. Outp. Size
Input Input Input Input
image pool1-1+pool1-2+pool1-3 {image,live} {image,live}
conv1-0 24/1 256 resize -/- 256 conv3-0 64/1 256
conv1-1 20/1 256 conv2-1 28/1 256 conv3-1 128/1 256 conv4-1 24/2 256
conv1-2 25/1 256 conv2-2 24/1 256 conv3-2 196/1 256 conv4-2 20/2 256
conv1-3 20/1 256 conv3-3 128/1 256 pool4-1 -/2 128
pool1-1 -/2 128 pool3-1 -/2 128
conv1-4 20/1 128 conv2-3 20/1 256 conv3-4 128/1 128 conv4-3 20/1 128
conv1-5 25/1 128 conv2-4 20/1 256 conv3-5 196/1 128 conv4-4 16/1 128
conv1-6 20/1 128 conv3-6 128/1 128 pool4-2 -/2 64
pool1-2 -/2 64 pool3-2 -/2 64
conv1-7 20/1 64 conv2-5 20/1 256 conv3-7 128/1 64 conv4-5 12/1 64
conv1-8 25/1 64 conv2-6 16/1 256 conv3-8 196/1 64 conv4-6 6/1 64
conv1-9 20/1 64 conv3-9 128/1 64 pool4-3 -/2 32
pool1-3 -/2 32 pool3-3 -/2 32
short-cut connection short-cut connection vectorize
pool1-1+pool1-2+pool1-3 pool3-1+pool3-2+pool3-3 1024
conv1-10 28/1 32 conv2-7 16/1 256 conv3-10 128/1 32 fc4-1 1/1 100
conv1-11 16/1 32 conv2-8 6/1 256 conv3-11 64/1 32 dropout - 0.2%
conv1-12 1/1 32 live (image - conv2-8) conv3-12 1/1 32 fc4-2 1/1 2
3.2 De-Spoof Network
Network Overview: Figure 3 shows the overall network architecture of our proposed
method. It consists of three parts: De-Spoof Net (DS Net), Discriminative Quality Net
(DQ Net), and Visual Quality Net (VQ Net). DS Net is designed to estimate the spoof
noise pattern N (i.e. the output of N (ˆI)) from the input image I. The live face Iˆ then
can be reconstructed by subtracting the estimated noise N from the input image I. This
reconstructed image Iˆ should be both visually appealing and indeed live, which will be
safeguarded by the DQ Net and VQ Net respectively. All networks can be trained in an
end-to-end fashion. The details of the network structure are shown in Tab. 1.
As the core part, DS Net is designed as an encoder-decoder structure with the input
I ∈ R256×256×6. Here the 6 channels are RGB + HSV color space, following the sug-
gestion in [31]. In the encoder part, we first stack 10 convolutional layers with 3 pooling
layers. Inspired by the residual network [40], we follow by a short-cut connection: con-
catenating the responses from pool1-1, pool1-2 with pool1-3, and then sending them to
conv1-10. This operation helps us to pass the feature responses from different scales
to the later stages and ease the training procedure. Going through 3 more convolution
layers, the responses F ∈ R32×32×32 from conv1-12 are the feature representation of
the spoof noise patterns. The higher magnitudes the responses have, the more spoofing-
perceptible the input is.
Out from the encoder, the feature representation F is fed into the decoder to recon-
struct the spoof noise pattern. F is directly resized to the input spatial size 256 × 256.
It introduces no extra grid artifacts, which exist in the alternative approach of using a
deconvolutional layer. Then, we pass the resized F to several convolutional layers to
reconstruct the noise pattern N. According to Eqn. 1, the reconstructed live image can
be retrieved by: xˆ = x−N(xˆ) = I−N.
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Each convolutional layer in the DS Net is equipped with exponential linear unit
(ELU) and batch normalization layers. To supervise the training of DS Net, we design
multiple loss functions: losses from DQ Net and VQ Net for the image quality, 0\1 map
loss, and noise property losses. We introduce these loss functions in Sec. 3.3-3.4.
3.3 DQ Net and VQ Net
While we do not have the ground truth to supervise the estimated spoof noise pattern, it
is possible to supervise the reconstructed live image, which implicitly guides the noise
estimation. To estimate a good-quality spoof noise, the reconstructed live image should
be quantitatively and visually recognized as live. For this purpose, we propose two net-
works in our architecture: Discriminative Quality Net (DQ Net) and Visual Quality Net
(VQ Net). The VQ Net aims to guarantee the reconstructed live face is photorealistic.
The DQ Net is proposed to guarantee the reconstructed face would indeed be consid-
ered as live, based on the judgment of a pre-trained face anti-spoofing network. The
details of our proposed architecture are shown in Tab. 1.
Discriminative Quality Net: We follow the state-of-the-art network architecture of
face anti-spoofing [18] to build our DQ Net. It is a fully convolutional network with
three filter blocks and three additional convolutional layers. Each block consists of three
convolutional layers and one pooling layer. The feature maps after each pooling layer
are resized and stacked to feed into the following convolutional layers. Finally, DQ Net
is supervised to estimate the pseudo-depth D of an input face, where D for the live face
is the depth of the face shape and D for the spoof face is a zero map as a flat surface.
We adopt the 3D face alignment algorithm in [41] to estimate the face shape and render
the depth via Z-Buffering.
Similar to the previous work [42], DQ Net is pre-trained to obtain the semantic
knowledge of live faces and spoofing faces. And during the training of DS Net, the
parameters of DQ Net are fixed. Since the reconstructed images Iˆ are live images, the
corresponding pseudo-depth D should be the depth of the face shape. The backpropa-
gation of the error from DQ Net guides the DS Net to estimate the spoof noise pattern
which should be subtracted from the input image,
JDQ =
∥∥∥CNNDQ(ˆI)− D∥∥∥
1
, (2)
where CNNDQ is a fixed network and D is the depth of the face shape.
Visual Quality Net: We deploy a GAN to verify the visual quality of the estimated live
image Iˆ. Given both the real live image Ilive and the synthesized live image Iˆ, VQ Net
is trained to distinguish between Ilive and Iˆ. Meanwhile, DS Net tries to reconstruct
photorealistic live images where the VQ Net would classify them as non-synthetic (or
real) images. The VQ Net consists of 6 convolutional layers and a fully connected layer
with a 2D vector as the output, which represents the probability of the input image to
be real or synthetic. In each iteration during the training, the VQ Net is evaluated with
two batches, in the first one, the DS Net is fixed and we update the VQ Net,
JV Qtrain = −EI∈R log(CNNV Q(I))− EI∈S log(1− CNNV Q(CNNDS(I))), (3)
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where R and S are the sets of real and synthetic images respectively. In the second
batch, the VQ Net is fixed and the DS Net is updated,
JV Qtest = −EI∈S log(CNNV Q(CNNDS(I))). (4)
3.4 Loss functions
The main challenge for spoof modeling is the lack of the ground truth for the spoof noise
pattern. Since we have concluded some properties about the spoof noise in Sec. 3.1, we
can leverage them to design several novel loss functions to constrain the convergence
space. First, we introduce magnitude loss to enforce the spoof noise of the live image
to be zero. Second, zero\one map loss is used to demonstrate the ubiquitousness of
the spoof noise. Third, we encourage the repetitiveness property of spoof noise via
repetitive loss. We describe three loss functions as the following:
Magnitude Loss: The spoof noise pattern for the live images is zero. The magnitude
loss can be utilized to impose the constraint for the estimated noise. Given the estimated
noise N and reconstructed live image Iˆ = I−N of an original live image I, we have,
Jm = ‖N‖1 . (5)
Zero\One Map Loss: To learn discriminative features in the encoder layers, we define
a sub-task in the DS Net to estimate a zero-map for the live faces and an one-map for
the spoof. Since this is a per pixel supervision, it is also a constraint of ubiquitousness
on the noise. Moreover, 0\1 map enables the receptive field of each pixel to cover a
local area, which helps to learn generalizable features for this problem. Formally, given
the extracted features F from an input face image I in the encoder, we have,
Jz = ‖CNN01map(F;Θ)−M‖1 , (6)
where M ∈ 032×32 or M ∈ 132×32 is the zero\one map label.
Repetitive Loss: Based on the previous discussion, we assume the spoof noise pattern
to be repetitive, because it is generated from the repetitive spoof medium. To encourage
the repetitiveness, we convert the estimated noiseN to the Fourier domain and compute
the maximum value in the high-frequency band. The existence of high peak is indicative
of the repetitive pattern. We would like to maximize this peak for spoof images, but
minimize it for live images, as the following loss function:
Jr =
{ −max(H(F(N), k)), I ∈ Spoof
‖max(H(F(N), k))‖1, I ∈ Live
,
where F is the Fourier transform operator, H is an operator for masking the low-
frequency domain of an image, i.e., setting a k × k region in the center of the shifted
2D Fourier response to zero.
Finally, the total loss function in our training is the weighted summation of the
aforementioned loss functions and the supervisions for the image qualities,
JT = Jz + λ1Jm + λ2Jr + λ3JDQ + λ4JV Qtest , (7)
where λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 are the weights. During the training, we alternate between opti-
mizing Eqn. 7 and Eqn. 3.
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Table 2. The accuracy of different outputs of the proposed architecture and their fusions.
Method 0\1 map Spoof noise Depth map Fusion (Spoof noise, Depth map) Fusion of all three outputs
Maximum Average Maximum Average
APCER 2.50 1.70 1.66 1.70 1.27 1.70 1.27
BPCER 2.52 1.70 1.68 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
ACER 2.51 1.70 1.67 1.72 1.50 1.72 1.50
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Experimental Setup
Databases We evaluate our work on three face anti-spoofing databases, with print
and replay attacks: Oulu-NPU [43], CASIA-MFSD [44] and Replay-Attack [45]. Oulu-
NPU [43] is a high-resolution database, considering many real-world variations. Oulu-
NPU also includes 4 testing protocols: Protocol 1 evaluates on the illumination varia-
tion, Protocol 2 examines the influence of different spoof medium, Protocol 3 inspects
the effect of different camera devices and Protocol 4 contains all the challenges above,
which is close to the scenario of cross testing. CASIA-MFSD [44] contains videos with
resolution 640×480 and 1280×720. Replay-Attack [45] includes videos of 320×240.
These two databases are often used for cross testing [2].
Parameter setting We implement our method in Tensorflow [46]. Models are trained
with the batch size of 6 and the learning rate of 3e−5. We set the k = 64 in the repetitive
loss and set λ1 to λ4 in Eqn. 7 as 3, 0.005, 0.1 and 0.016, respectively. DQ Net is
trained separately and remains fixed during the update of DS Net and VQ Net, but all
sub-networks are trained with the same and respective data in each protocol.
Evaluation metrics To compare with previous methods, we use Attack Presentation
Classification Error Rate (APCER) [47], Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error
Rate (BPCER) [47] and, ACER = (APCER + BPCER)/2 [47] for the intra testing on
Oulu-NPU, and Half Total Error Rate (HTER) [48], half of the summation of FAR and
FRR, for the cross testing between CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack.
4.2 Ablation Study
Using Oulu-NPU Protocol 1, we perform three studies on the effect of score fusing, the
importance of each loss function, and the influence of image resolution and blurriness.
Different fusion methods In the proposed architecture, three outputs can be utilized
for classification: the norms of either the 0\1 map, the spoof noise pattern or the depth
map. Because of the discriminativeness enabled by our learning, we can simply use a
rudimentary classifier like L-1 norm. Note that a more advance classifier is applica-
ble and would likely lead to higher performance. Table 2 shows the performance of
each output and their fusion with maximum and average. It shows that the fusion of
spoof noise and depth map achieves the best performance. However, adding the 0\1
map scores do not improve the accuracy since it contains the same information as the
spoof noise. Hence, for the rest of experiments, we report performance from the average
fusion of the spoof noise N and the depth map Dˆ, i.e., score = (‖N‖1 +
∥∥∥Dˆ∥∥∥
1
)/2.
Advantage of each loss function We have three main loss functions in our proposed
architecture. To shows the effect of each loss function, we train a network with each loss
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Table 3. ACER of the proposed method with different image resolutions and blurriness. To create
blurry images, we apply Gaussian filters with different kernel sizes to the input images.
XXXXXXXXXMetric
Resolution
256× 256 128× 128 64× 64
APCER 1.27 2.27 5.24
BPCER 1.73 3.36 5.30
ACER 1.50 3.07 5.27
XXXXXXXXXMetric
Blurriness
1× 1 3× 3 5× 5 7× 7 9× 9
APCER 1.27 2.29 3.12 3.95 4.79
BPCER 1.73 2.50 3.33 4.16 5.00
ACER 1.50 2.39 3.22 4.06 4.89
Table 4. The intra testing results on 4 protocols of Oulu-NPU.
Protocol Method APCER (%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
CPqD[49] 2.9 10.8 6.9
1 GRADIANT[49] 1.3 12.5 6.9
Auxiliary[18] 1.6 1.6 1.6
Ours 1.2 1.7 1.5
MixedFASNet[49] 9.7 2.5 6.1
2 Ours 4.2 4.4 4.3
Auxiliary[18] 2.7 2.7 2.7
GRADIANT 3.1 1.9 2.5
MixedFASNet 5.3± 6.7 7.8± 5.5 6.5± 4.6
3 GRADIANT 2.6± 3.9 5.0± 5.3 3.8± 2.4
Ours 4.0± 1.8 3.8± 1.2 3.6± 1.6
Auxiliary[18] 2.7± 1.3 3.1± 1.7 2.9± 1.5
Massy HNU [49] 35.8± 35.3 8.3± 4.1 22.1± 17.6
4 GRADIANT 5.0± 4.5 15.0± 7.1 10.0± 5.0
Auxiliary[18] 9.3± 5.6 10.4± 6.0 9.5± 6.0
Ours 5.1± 6.3 6.1± 5.1 5.6± 5.7
excluded one by one. By disabling the magnitude loss, the 0\1 map loss and the repeti-
tive loss, we obtain the ACERs 5.24, 2.34 and 1.50, respectively. To further validate the
repetitive loss, we perform an experiment on high-resolution images by changing the
network input to the cheek region of the original 1080P resolution. The ACER of the
network with the repetitive loss is 2.92 but the network without cannot converge.
Resolution and blurriness As shown in the ablation study of repetitive loss, the image
quality is critical for achieving a high accuracy. The spoof noise pattern may not be
detected in the low-resolution or motion-blurred images. The testing results on different
image resolutions and blurriness are shown in Tab. 3. These results validate that the
spoof noise pattern is less discriminative for the lower-resolution or blurry images, as
the high-frequency part of the input images contains most of the spoof noise pattern.
4.3 Experimental Comparison
To show the performance of our proposed method, we present our accuracy in the intra
testing of Oulu-NPU and the cross testing on CASIA and Replay-Attack.
Intra Testing We compare our intra testing performance on all 4 protocols of Oulu-
NPU. Table 4 shows the comparison of our method and the best 3 out of 18 previous
methods [18,49]. Our proposed method achieves promising results on all protocols.
Specifically, we outperform the previous state of the art by a large margin in Protocol
4, which is the most challenging protocol, and similar to cross testing.
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Table 5. The HTER of different methods for the cross testing between the CASIA-MFSD and
the Replay-Attack databases. We mark the top-2 performances in bold.
Method
Train Test Train Test
CASIA Replay Replay CASIA
MFSD Attack Attack MFSD
Motion [4] 50.2% 47.9%
LBP-TOP [4] 49.7% 60.6%
Motion-Mag [50] 50.1% 47.0%
Spectral cubes [51] 34.4% 50.0%
CNN [8] 48.5% 45.5%
LBP [24] 47.0% 39.6%
Colour Texture [25] 30.3% 37.7%
Auxiliary[18] 27.6% 28.4%
Ours 28.5% 41.1%
Cross Testing We perform cross testing between CASIA-MFSD [44] and Replay-
Attack [45]. As shown in Tab. 5, our method achieves the competitive performance on
the cross testing from CASIA-MFSD to Replay-Attack. However, we achieve a worse
HTER compared to the best performing methods from Replay Attack to CASIA-MFSD.
We hypothesize the reason is that images of CASIA-MFSD are of much higher reso-
lution than those of Replay Attack. This shows that the model trained with higher-
resolution data can generalize well on lower-resolution testing data, but not the other
way around. This is one limitation of the proposed method, and worthy further research.
4.4 Qualitative Experiments
Spoof medium classification The estimated spoof noise pattern of the test images
can be used for clustering them into different groups and each group represents one
spoof medium. To visualize the results, we use t-SNE [52] for dimension reduction.
The t-SNE projects the noise N ∈ R256×256×6 to 2 dimensions by best preserving the
KL divergence distance. Fig. 4 shows the distributions of the testing videos on Oulu-
NPU Protocol 1. The left image shows that the noise of live is well-clustered, and the
noise of spoof is subject dependent, which is consistent with our noise assumption. To
obtain a better visualization, we utilize the high pass filter to extract the high-frequency
information of noise pattern for dimension reduction. The right image shows that the
high frequency part has more subject independent information about the spoof type and
can be utilized for classification of the spoof medium.
To further show the discriminative power of the estimated spoof noise, we divide
the testing set of Protocol 1 to training and testing parts and train an SVM classifier for
spoof medium classification. We train two models, a three-class classifier (live, print and
display) and a five-class classifier (live, print1, print2, display1 and display2), and they
achieve the classification accuracy of 82.0% and 54.3% respectively, shown in Tab. 6.
Most classification errors of the five-class model are within the same spoof medium.
This result is noteworthy given that no label of spoof medium type is provided during
the learning of the spoof noise model. Yet the estimated noise actually carries apprecia-
ble information regarding the medium type; hence we can observe reasonable results of
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Fig. 4. The 2D visualization of the estimated spoof noise for test videos on Oulu-NPU Protocol
1. Left: the estimated noise, Right: the high-frequency band of the estimated noise, Color code
used: black=live, green=printer1, blue=printer2, magenta=display1, red=display2.
Table 6. The confusion matrices of spoof mediums classification based on spoof noise pattern.
PPPPPPPActual
Predicted
live print display
live 59 1 0
print 0 88 32
display 13 8 99
PPPPPPPActual
Predicted
live print1 print2 display1 display2
live 59 0 1 0 0
print1 0 41 2 11 6
print2 0 34 11 9 6
display1 10 6 0 13 31
display2 8 7 0 6 39
spoof medium classification. This demonstrates that the estimated noise contains spoof
medium information and indeed we are moving toward estimating the faithful spoof
noise residing in each spoof image. In the future, if the performance of spoof medium
classification improves, this could bring new impact to applications such as forensic.
Successful and failure cases We show several success and failure cases in Fig. 5-
6. Fig. 5 shows that the estimated spoof noises are similar within each medium but
different from the other mediums. We suspect that the yellowish color in the first four
columns is due to the stronger color distortion in the paper attack. The fifth row shows
that the estimated noise for the live images is nearly zero. For the failure cases, we only
have a few false positive cases. The failures are due to undesired noise estimation which
will motivate us for further research.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces a new perspective for solving the face anti-spoofing by inversely
decomposing a spoof face into the live face and the spoof noise pattern. A novel CNN
architecture with multiple appropriate supervisions is proposed. We design loss func-
tions to encourage the pattern of the spoof images to be ubiquitous and repetitive, while
the noise of the live images should be zero. We visualize the spoof noise pattern which
can help to have a deeper understanding of the added noise by each spoof medium. We
evaluate the proposed method on multiple widely-used face anti-spoofing databases.
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Fig. 5. The visualization of input images, estimated spoof noises and estimated live images for
test videos of Protocol 1 of Oulu-NPU database. The first four columns in the first row are paper
attacks and the second four are the replay attacks. For a better visualization, we magnify the noise
by 5 times and add the value with 128, to show both positive and negative noise.
Spoof
Images
Estimated
Noise
Estimated
Live
Fig. 6. The failure cases for converting the spoof images to the live ones.
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